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C00002 00002	Thanks for the copy of your review.  May I copy it into PUB,JMC
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Thanks for the copy of your review.  May I copy it into PUB,JMC
which contains other comments on the subject?
They are the files WEIZEN.1, WEIZEN.2, etc.

āˆ‚19-MAR-76  1755	FTP:LEDERBERG at SUMEX-AIM	Weizenbaum book			[JMC 
Date: 19 MAR 1976 1734-PST
From: LEDERBERG at SUMEX-AIM
Subject: Weizenbaum book			[JMC
To:   jmc at SU-AI

John- I don't know the full context of your message. Had you seen the
review that I just sent to the NYT?

Just in case, here is the text:

     "Computer power and human reason" is a mosaic of
well-reasoned analysis and passionate pleading on the nature of
computers and of man, and about the place that computers (read
"technology" if you wish) should have in human affairs. Prof.
Weizenbaum is particularly exercised about the claims for and
prospects of AI, "artificial intelligence", the efforts to
emulate and bolster human reasoning processes as programs in
computers. A well known computer scientist at M.I.T, who has
made significant contributions to AI, he  writes that he was
moved to write this tract when people responded to one of his
programs as if it were an empathic companion .This
over-estimation of, and over-dependence upon computers,he
believes to be both symptom and  cause of global predicaments
with more horrors to come.
     Weizenbaum may still be too much a technocrat: witness his
oversimplifications of social movements as the immediate fruits
of technical innovations. (There is more to the history of the
internal migration and urbanization of American blacks than the
introduction  of the mechanical cotton-picker in the 1950's.)But
to dwell on these would do too little justice to the other
fundamental issues that Weizenbaum raises.Indeed he might be the
first to deplore his own vestigial technocratic biases, when
they are inconsistent with his fundamental ethical philosophy.
Nor should one harp on his ad hominem attacks on some of his
colleagues, his bludgeoning them with selected quotations from
writings of 20 years ago,which I suspect he will view as a lapse
more from enthusiasm than from malicious intention.
     Most readers will follow the author's advice to skip over
the early chapters which detail the fundamental logic of the
computer -- these would make another, peerless book for
explaining Turing's work on the fundamental logic of  computing
machines to the lay  reader.  The basic philosophical and policy
issues do not need this detail, and are best scrutinized by
reading the book back-to-front: few readers with the interest
and general intellectual grounding to  digest this work critically,
will need to be reintroduced to the fundamentals. Others
will be attracted by pages of lyrical anti-technology slogans,
which the author's technical reputation will make the more
persuasive. Since the author categorically rejects "instrumental
reason" in its application to human affairs, it is difficult to
engage him in a discussion of his particular policy concerns.
     Weizenbaum makes a conscientious effort to distinguish his
assertions of faith from the scientific consensus; but the
non-specialist reader will still have to look closely to be
sure. Perhaps in fields like the physiology of the right versus
left brain he has already persuaded himself that contemporary
speculations are proven realities about the location of human
rational functions. But others should be cautioned that we still
know even less about the organization of human intellect than
Weizenbaum stipulates.
     During the early adolescence of computer science in the
early 50's, many workers made extravagant prophecies about the
ease with which the new machines would be programmed to match
human problem-solving behavior -"within the visible future", we
were told, machines would conduct mechanical translations of
high quality  (especially from Russian into English). They would
play chess to the disadvantage of the masters, and they might
then be ready to take over many of the higher-level functions of
management in industry, and of command and control in the
military. Within a few years, the power of machines to
manipulate bits of information had been enhanced a million-fold:
what more could one ask as the basis for these new powers?. It
is no surprise, and by now no news, that these prophecies were
simply wrong; and the wiser among us should have learned not to
make technological forecasts where we simply had new tools, but
no real insight into the structure of the tasks they were to
address. Surely, as Weizenbaum insists, there are few things
less well understood than human creative imagination. His own
prophecy is that this will NEVER be emulated to any significant
measure by computing machines. This hypothesis is beyond the
range of scientific criticism, short of tangible advances too
much to hope for right away; but his arguments are mainly
repetitious assertions of his personal faith.
     No, there is one more persuasive kernel: namely that the 
world-knowledge which underlies human understanding (compassion
and judgment ) needs the life-long experience of having been
human -- in a word, of having shared love .It is unlikely and
undesirable that machines  be offered that privilege; then 
many realms will be uniquely human. Indeed we must make equally
sure that the fellow-creatures to whom we confide our trust for
ethical and esthetic leadership justify this on the same
grounds. And those who deify the machines deserve the human
sacrifices that may result from neglecting the human
responsibility for moral decisions.
     Weizenbaum's pleading overreaches this sufficient argument
to an out-and-out obscurantism about the fundamental
non-comprehensibility of the human brain, which adds little to
the debates between vitalists and mechanists of the last two
centuries. It is a sterile debate; and scientists can contribute
more by trying to find what can be learned about our own nature,
and putting it to human good, than arguing what may or may not
be ultimately knowable. As with his concern about the bounds of
AI, the mischief of such criticism is that it may disparage the
work of investigators with more concrete, modest and achievable
goals. The view that the core of the cell's reproductive
capability was unknowable in chemical terms bears much of the
onus for long delays in our understanding of the structure of
DNA. After the fact, this proved to be remarkably simple.
     While we should not offer love to the machine, there is
much to be said for permitting it to evolve, that is to nurture
the growth of more and more complex programs. These are
initiated by human intelligence, but grow from the dynamics
built into the starting program itself. It is hard to see how
some of the more complex problems to be addressed can be solved
by programs that are explicitly written in detail by human
authors. Then I agree with Weizenbaum that we can longer claim
to have a full-fledged explanation of a phenomenon, merely
through having  generated a model for it. We may even have
substantial power to solve problems without necessarily
"understanding" them. (Unfortunately, this criticism does little
to help us recognize true understanding by any objective
criterion). Furthermore, we should not trust such complex
programs merely because we believe we were sufficiently
intelligent in our original design plans. Instead, the program
will have become another  experiment, to be validated only by
experience. Much the same ought to be said for other areas of
human aspiration, like politics.
     Throughout his book, Weizenbaum oscillates between a
disparagement of the potential and actual accomplishments of AI,
dismay at what he sees as excessive faith and dependence on this
technology, and concern for some potential abuses of its
development, should it be realized. That policy-makers, the
public, and computer scientists alike should take a more
critical and pragmatic view of the field than the zealots of 20
years ago may be granted; many well-informed people within the
field clearly do, without having reacted as strongly as
Weizenbaum.
     The abuses might be either ideological or technological. If
human intelligence were more successfully mirrored in the
machine, will that not justify treating human beings as if they
were MERE machines? His position on this issue is colored by the
experience of Nazi Germany; but the argument is confused. The
most savage tyrannies that I can find in history, including
Nazism, had no doubt about a unique elan-vital -- just that one
folk or credo had more than an equal share.
People who are philosophically concerned about the mechanistic
basis of life are also overawed by its complexity, and too
concerned about learning more about it to occupy themselves with
holy wars. They are the least likely to be sacrificing either
people or  machines on the grounds of ideological conviction. 
     The historical record is less reassuring about the
augmentation of power in the hands of irrational man: we can
still argue about the case against Prometheus,Gutenberg,
Galileo,or Faraday -- not to mention Oppenheimer --  
but by that very token, I do not share
Weizenbaum's confidence in deciding which innovations are
dangerous. He points to very real concerns about machines that
could interpret speech (while denying their feasibility). Yes--
they might make large scale wire-tapping irresistible, and
perhaps undo the virtues of the telephone as a medium of private
communication. They might also relieve millions of
office-persons from the mindless tasks of transcribing the words
of others, and free them for more creative responsibilities.
Both of these contingencies lay heavy burdens on the
adaptability of our social institutions, and it is important
that we be alerted to them.
     Weizenbaum does point to projects in mathematics and
chemistry where computers have shown their potential for
assisting human scientists in solving problems. He correctly
points out that these successes are based on the existence of
"strong theories" about their subject matter. We can agree that
"common sense" is the human competence  hardest to copy in a
machine, and that the most constructive advances should come
from the wisest division of labor in a synergism of man and his
machines.Computers will not give us magical answers to the
problems that we, or they, create: with sweat and insight we may
be able to develop them as ever more effective tools to serve
human needs.


Josh
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